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COMMENTS
CRIMINAL LAW - PLEA BARGAINING - SOUTH CAROLINA SU-
PREME COURT ADMONISHES JUDICIAL PARTICIPATION IN PLEA BAR-
GAINING, State v. Cross, 270 S.C. 44, 240 S.E.2d 514 (1977).
In State v. Cross,' the South Carolina Supreme Court reiter-
ated its approval of the practice of plea bargaining;2 however, the
court also voiced strong disapproval of judicial initiation of, or
participation in, plea negotiations.3 The supreme court held that
a guilty plea induced by statements of the judge participating in
the plea bargaining negotiations could not be said to have been
entered voluntarily and was therefore coerced as a matter of
law.4
Defendant Cross was charged in six indictments with violat-
ing South Carolina's pistol law.5 After the state had rested its case
during trial on the first indictment, counsel for the defense, the
solicitor, and the judge held a conference.6 During this meeting,
the judge promised defense counsel that if defendant pleaded
guilty, the sentence would be only a substantial fine; but if the
trial continued and the jury found him guilty, defendant would
receive at least a one-year sentence on that charge alone.7 After
counsel informed him of the judge's statements, Cross withdrew
1. 270 S.C. 44, 240 S.E.2d 514 (1977).
2. Id. at 48, 240 S.E.2d at 516. The court cited Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257
(1971), as authority for its approval. Id. In Santobello, the United States Supreme Court
approved and encouraged plea bargaining, 404 U.S. at 260-61, but the Court has also held
that there is no constitutional right to plea bargain. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545,
560-61 (1977). The South Carolina Supreme Court intimated its approval of plea bargain-
ing in Sanders v. Leeke, 254 S.C. 444, 175 S.E.2d 796 (1970).
3. 270 S.C. at 48-49, 240 S.E.2d at 516-17. See generally ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY § 3.3 (Approved
Draft 1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS]; Gallagher, Judicial Participation in
Plea Bargaining: A Search for New Standards, 9 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 29 (1974); Note,
The Unconstitutionality of Plea Bargaining, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1387 (1970). But see Alschu-
ler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1059 (1976);
Note, Restructuring the Plea Bargain, 82 YALE L.J. 286 (1972); Lambros, Plea Bargaining
and the Sentencing Process, 53 F.R.D. 509 (1971).
4. 270 S.C. at 48, 240 S.E.2d at 516-17.
5. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-31-110 to -200 (1976). Specifically, Cross was charged with
selling pistols without a license and having in his possession a gun from which the serial
number had been removed. 270 S.C. at 45-46, 240 S.E.2d at 515.
6. 270 S.C. at 46, 240 S.E.2d at 515. It is not clear where the conference was held
and no verbatim record of the proceeding was made.
7. Id. at 47, 240 S.E.2d at 516.
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his not guilty plea and pleaded guilty to all six indictments.,
On appeal, Cross asserted, inter alia, that his plea Was not
voluntary because he was unduly coerced by the judge to plead
guilty.' Cross argued that he had been willing to take his chances
with the jury, but the judge's influence in the subsequent bar-
gaining had impaired the voluntariness of his participation and
that he was left with no alternative but to plead guilty.'" The
State relied on the theory that defendant had been aware of the
alternatives available to him, that he had known the merits of his
case, that his plea had been voluntarily and intelligently made,
and that the judge's questioning at the time defendant entered
his plea accorded with constitutional standards."
The South Carolina Supreme Court sustained defendant's
assertion in a per curiam opinion.
2
We agreee with the defendant that he was placed in a posi-
tion of being unduly coerced as a matter of law, inasmuch as he
had no choice but to enter guilty pleas in order to avoid an
assured prison sentence in the event of conviction.
We hold under the facts of this case that the defendant was
unduly coerced, as a matter of law, to give up his constitutional
right to plead not guilty.1'
8. Id. Appellant claimed that a prison term would mean disaster for his financially
failing business. Brief for Appellant at 7. Cross received consecutive sentences totaling 10
years or a fine of $9,000. 270 S.C. at 46, 240 S.E.2d at 515.
9. Id. at 46, 240 S.E.2d at 516. Other exceptions not considered by the court included
contentions that (1) the sentence was excessive, even though it was within limits provided
by the applicable statute, because defendant was coerced into pleading guilty and (2) that
the court erred in refusing to sign an order that would have required federal agents to
return appellant's records for trial. Record at 90.
10. Brief for Appellant at 7, 10.
11. Brief for Respondent at 20. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), was cited to
show compliance with the standards required in court acceptance of guilty pleas. Brief
for Respondent at 27. Boykin mandated that the state court's record of the proceeding
must clearly show that the defendant voluntarily and understandingly entered his plea of
guilty.
What is at stake for an accused facing death or imprisonment demands the
utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in canvassing the matter with the
accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and
of its consequences. When the judge discharges that function, he leaves a record
adequate for any review that may be later sought. ...
395 U.S. at 243-44 (footnote and citations omitted). See also Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742 (1970); State v. Armstrong, 263 S.C. 594, 211 S.E.2d 889 (1975); FED. R. CluM.
P. II.
12. 270 S.C. 44, 240 S.E.2d 514. The court remanded the case to allow appellant to
withdraw his guilty plea. Id. at 51, 240 S.E.2d at 518.
13. Id. at 47-50, 240 S.E.2d at 516-17.
2
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This portion of the court's opinion is supported by both case law
and legal commentary,'4 which state that coercive statements
made by the judge effectively vitiate the voluntariness of a guilty
plea.'5 Few defendants would continue a trial knowing that they
would receive either no consideration from the judge or the maxi-
mum sentence upon conviction, especially when the judge has
promised a lesser punishment on a guilty plea. 6 The court's dic-
tum, however, admonishing all judicial participation in plea bar-
gaining, is on less secure footing if interpreted as a warning that
any participation will result in a finding of involuntariness. Cross,
therefore, raises the question of whether a judge can or should
participate at all in the actual plea bargaining. To analyze possi-
ble answers to this question, the law of other jurisdictions and the
source of the right to a voluntary plea will be reviewed. This
analysis will be followed by a discussion of the impact the no-
participation rule would have on the South Carolina court sys-
tem. 
7
Whether judicial participation in plea bargaining negotia-
tions is sufficient in itself to support a determination that a guilty
plea was coerced, and made involuntarily, is an unsettled issue.
Two approaches are taken by courts in evaluating the effect of
judicial participation. One is known as the "per se" approach and
the other is called the "totality" or "relevant circumstances"
14. See Euziere v. United States, 249 F.2d 293 (10th Cir. 1957) (judge told defendant
that maximum sentence would be imposed after conviction unless he pleaded guilty);
United States v. Tateo, 214 F. Supp. 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (judge threatened defendant,
after trial had begun, with consecutive maximum sentences if the trial continued and
offered the defendant a hope of leniency if he pleaded guilty); State v. Benfield, 264 N.C.
75, 140 S.E.2d 706 (1965) (during a mid-trial conference, judge told defense counsel that
he was inclined to give a long sentence on conviction). But see United States ex rel.
McGrath v. LaVallee, 319 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1963) (trial judge's remarks to defendant
concerning likelihood of acquittal and no consideration from court if convicted held not
coercive threat, but only a description of the consequences of defendant's choice of plea).
See generally authorities cited note 3 supra.
15. See Shupe v. Sigler, 230 F. Supp. 601 (D. Neb. 1964); United States v. Tateo,
214 F. Supp. 560 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
16. Only those defendants who are confident of their acquittal will take advantage
of their right to a jury trial, a result violative of the constitutional privilege of trial by jury,
17. 270 S.C. at 48, 240 S.E.2d at 516-17. The court asserted:
While we acquiesce in the tendency of the courts to allow plea bargaining we
are of the opinion that the judge should not initiate or influence the agreement,
nor be a party to the negotiations. A plea induced by the influence of the judge
cannot be said to have been voluntarily entered. . . .The negotiations should
be between the adversaries. The judge is not the adversary of either [the solici-
tor or defendant and his counsel].
1979]
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approach.', Those jurisdictions adopting the "per se" approach
generally prohibit all judicial participation in plea negotiations. '
Any participation by the judge will presumptively render a plea
involuntary. Those jurisdictions adopting the "totality" view, al-
though not unanimously condoning the practice of judicial partic-
ipation, consider all relevant circumstances in determining
whether a guilty plea is voluntary."0 Some participation, even a
judicial description of the consequences of a defendant's choice
of a plea, may not compel a finding of involuntariness.
Despite confusion over statements in Brady v. United
States,21 the United States Supreme Court has not directly ad-
dressed the question of whether mere judicial participation in
plea negotiations will support a finding of involuntariness. 2  In
Brady the Court reserved judgment on whether the judge's sen-
tencing power is coercive as a matter of law,2 and addressed only
the narrow issue of the validity of a guilty plea entered to avoid
the death penalty under the Federal Kidnapping Act. Brady
argued that because his plea was induced by the fear of possible
death, it was made involuntarily. In rejecting this argument, the
Court held that the voluntariness of Brady's plea could "be deter-
18. For examples of the "per se" approach, see United States v. Werker, 535 F.2d 198
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 926 (1976); Euziere v. United States, 249 F.2d 293 (10th
Cir. 1957); United States ex reL Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
Other courts examine all circumstances surrounding the plea. E.g., Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970); Brown v. Peyton, 435 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 931 (1972); People v. Merchant, 4 Il. App. 3d 937, 283 N.E.2d 721 (1972).
Commentators are equally divided. See authorities cited note 3 supra. For a good dis-
cussion of each side of the argument, see Gallagher, supra note 3, at 38-44.
19. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Evans, 434 Pa. 52, 252 A.2d 689 (1969); FED. R. CaM.
P. I1.
20. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Robinson v. Housewright, 525 F.2d 988 (7th Cir.
1975); United States ex rel. Rosa v. Follette, 395 F.2d 721 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
892 (1968),
21. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
22. See Gallagher, supra note 3, at 38.45; see also Ramsey v. New York, 47 U.S.L.W.
4270 (March 5, 1979) (Certiorari was granted to consider the effect of judicial coercion on
a guilty plea. Because the issue was not actually presented in brief or oral argument,
certiorari was dismissed as improvidently granted.)
23. The Supreme Court limited its holding as follows:
We here make no reference to the situation where the prosecutor or judge, or
both, deliberately employ their charging and sentencing powers to induce a
particular defendant to tender a plea of guilty. In Brady's case there is no claim
.. . that the trial judge threatened Brady with a harsher sentence if convicted
after trial in order to induce him to plead guilty.
Id. at 751 n.8.
24. 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a).
25. 397 U.S. at 744.
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mined only by considering all of the relevant circumstances sur-
rounding it.' ,26 Relying on the Court's explicit reservation of judg-
ment on the judicial participation issue, one commentator has
concluded Brady does not preclude a promised sentence situa-
tion, as in Cross, from being held to be per se involuntary:
The critical factual distinction as to the certainty of the
sentence [under mandatory provision of Federal Kidnapping
Act] prevents the relevant circumstances standard posited in
Brady from authoritatively governing the situation where the
judge offers a sentence to the defendant in exchange for his plea
of guilty.
7
Some courts, however, have adapted the "relevant circumstan-
ces" approach taken in Brady and hold that judicial participa-
tion, even to the extent of promises made during pre-plea negotia-
tions, does not per se coerce a defendant to plead guilty or render
the plea involuntary. 8
The lower federal courts do not appear to be consistent in
their choice between the "per se" and "relevant circumstances"
approaches. In United States v. Werker, 9 the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals considered the issue of whether judicial partici-
pation is allowed in plea bargaining. The trial judge had proposed
to inform defense counsel, before the plea was taken, of the sent-
ence that he intended to impose on defendant. The prosecutor
sought a writ of mandamus prohibiting the disclosure and the
circuit court enjoined the trial judge." The circuit court based its
decision on revised Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure, which provides that "[tihe court shall not participate in
any such [plea agreement] discussions."' 3' The court stated that:
the sentencing judge should take no part whatever in any dis-
cussion or communication regarding the sentence to be imposed
prior to the entry of a plea of guilty or conviction, or submission
26. Id. at 749; accord, Sanders v. Leeke, 254 S.C. 444, 175 S.E.2d 796 (1970); Breland
v. State, 253 S.C. 187, 169 S.E.2d 604 (1969).
27. Gallagher, supra note 3, at 43. But see Brown v. Peyton, 435 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 931 (1972).
28. United States ex rel. Robinson v. Housewright, 525 F.2d 988 (7th Cir. 1975) (by
implication); Brown v. Peyton, 435 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 931
(1972).
29. 535 F.2d 198 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 926 (1976).
30. Id. at 205. The Assistant United States Attorney for the Southern District of New
York had a policy of not negotiating sentence recommendations in return for guilty pleas.
Id. at 200.
31. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(1).
1979] 617
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to him of a plea agreement. . . . We believe that the circum-
stances in which the judge would elicit information necessary to
formulate a pre-plea sentence and the consequences of the offer
of that sentence would create the very dangers that the proscrip-
tion in Rule 11 was intended to avoid2
Although the court purported to disclaim the importance of
choosing between the "per se" or 'totality" approaches, dicta in
Werker indicates that the "per se" approach influenced the deci-
sion.:"
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States ex
rel. Robinson v. Housewright,35 held that a judge's participation
in plea discussions does not, in itself, render a plea involuntary. "
On requesting a writ of habeas corpus, petitioner argued that "the
direct participation of the trial judge in negotiations leading to
his plea of guilty was not consistent with constitutional standards
. . . .)7 The circuit court affirmed the state appellate court's
denial of relief and agreed that the applicable Illinois Supreme
Court rule 3 did not render all judicial participation in plea bar-
gaining negotiations unconstitutional or improper .3 The Illinois
rule provides that "[tihe trial judge shall not initiate plea dis-
cussions.", ' The circuit court also interpreted the relevant section
of the American Bar Association standards, which was the basis
for the revised Federal Rule 11, as a rule of practice and not a
constitutional limitation.4 That section states that "[t]he trial
judge should not participate in plea discussions."42 Recognizing
the limited federal court jurisdiction over state court procedure,' :
32. 535 F.2d at 201 (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 203. The court stated: "It is immaterial whether we consider pre-plea
disclosure of sentence to be per se coercive ... or only one factor to be considered in
determining voluntariness .... ." Id.
34. Id. The court in Werker quoted with approval from a "per se" case, United States
ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Elksnis has not been over-
ruled in the Second Circuit.
35. 525 F.2d 988 (7th Cir. 1975).
36. Id. at 991; accord, Toler v. Wyrick, 563 F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98
S. Ct. 1455 (1978); Brown v. Peyton, 435 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
931 (1972).
37. 525 F.2d at 989.
38. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 402 (d)(1) provides that "[t]he trial judge shall not initiate plea
discussions."
39. Id. at 991.
40. ILL. Sup. CT. R. 402(d)(1).
41. 525 F.2d at 990-91.
42. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 3, at § 3.3. The ABA STANDARDS were followed closely
in the Rule 11 revisions.
43. 525 F.2d at 991.
[Vol. 30
6
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 8
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol30/iss3/8
PLEA BARGAINING
the Housewright court further stated: "Unless the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits judicial participation in plea negotiations,
this court should not interfere with state efforts to incorporate
properly administered 'plea bargaining' as one component, argu-
ably an essential one, in its administration of criminal justice."4
The court then decided the issue of voluntariness by analyzing all
of the "objective record facts" in the state evidentiary hearing
transcript. "- After examining the judge's participation "within
the context of its exercise,"4" the court held that no "ground exists
for defendant's conclusion that he would be penalized were he to
have rejected the agreement and exercised his right to a trial by
either court or jury.""
In Toler v. Wyrick,45 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
expressed approval of the implied "totality" approach in
Housewright.9 Defendant's contentions were similar to those
made by Cross in the South Carolina case: his guilty plea was
involuntarily entered because the judge actively participated in
the plea bargaining and threatened him with a long sentence if
he did not plead guilty.50 Although the court agreed that active
participation by a federal judge is prohibited by Rule 11, it stated
that Missouri courts hold "that such participation, in and of
itself, does not require setting a guilty plea aside."'5' In Toler, the
trial judge's statements differed from those made in Cross. No
threats were made by the judge concerning sentencing on convic-
tion, and the court, therefore, found no basis for the involuntari-
ness contention. The Toler court also cited Brady as support for
its view that "a guilty plea entered to avoid a possible greater
punishment is not necessarily involuntary." 2 The court deter-
mined that a defendant's subjective belief, at the time of his plea,
that he would receive a more severe punishment if convicted by
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 992. The trial judge had promised counsel, in a meeting with the prosecutor,
that he would give defendant the minimum sentence on a plea of guilty. Id.'at 990, 992.
47. Id. at 992 (quoting the Illinois appellate court's decision in People v. Robinson,
17 I1. App. 3d 310, 314, 308 N.E.2d 88, 91-92 (1974)).
48. 563 F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 907 (1978).
49. Id. at 373-74.
50. Id. at 373.
51. Id. at 374. The state appellate court had explained: "While we cannot approve
of the judge's conduct, the fact that he participated in the bargaining does not end our
inquiry into the voluntariness of the defendant's plea of guilty, which, is the essential
matter at issue." Toler v. State, 542 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Mo. App. 1976).
52. 563 F.2d at 375.
19791
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a jury than if he pleaded guilty, would not in itself render a guilty
plea involuntary. 3
Many state courts have taken a position similar to that of the
court in Commonwealth v. Evans,5 cited by the South Carolina
Supreme Court in Cross. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Evans held that participation by a judge in plea negotiations is
never proper. 5 The trial judge had informed counsel that if de-
fendant pleaded guilty to all five indictments against him, the
court would sentence him on only one and all the charges would
be considered as one act.16 No threats were made by the judge.
The court, however, believed that "the unquestioned pressure
placed on the defendant because of the judge's unique role in-
evitably taints the plea . . . ,,15 A strong dissent argued that
the three-party plea conference, commonly used in Pennsylvania
courts, was more beneficial than the system that would result
under the newly created prohibition." The dissent insisted that
the conference helped reduce the burgeoning backlog of cases,
protected society from the "possibility that a guilty man may be
acquitted," and enabled a defendant to receive a fair and just
sentence, possibly less than one he would receive after trial.
59
The Cross decision probably is consistent with the majority
of jurisdictions if it is limited to the narrow factual situation with
which it dealt. Most courts view judicial threats as unlawful in-
ducements that vitiate the voluntariness of a guilty plea.60 Addi-
tionally, the court may be in the forefront with those decisions
implying that fundamental fairness requires that judicial partici-
pation in plea bargaining be limited. By fashioning a broad rule
that a judge should not be a party to plea negotiations, however,
53. Id. at 373-74. Since defendant alleged no additional facts to those set forth in the
trial record to support an inference that the plea had been involuntary, the court looked
only to the transcript in its determination of the issue. Id.
54. 434 Pa. 52, 252 A.2d 689 (1969). See, e.g., Rogers v. State, 243 Miss. 219, 136 So.
2d 331 (1962); State v. Wolfe, 46 Wis. 2d 478, 175 N.W.2d 216 (1970) (dictum). But see,
e.g., Commonwealth v. Rothman, 222 Pa. Super. 309, 294 A.2d 783 (1972).
55. 434 Pa. at 55-56, 252 A.2d at 691. The court expressly stated that "[ult is the
view of this court that such a procedure is not consistent with due process and that a plea
entered on the basis of a sentencing arrangement in which the judge participates cannot
be considered voluntary." Id. at 54, 252 A.2d at 690.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 57, 252 A.2d at 691 (emphasis added). The court asserted that it would not
differentiate between cases in which the judge kept his bargain and those where he re-
neged. Id.
58. 434 Pa. 52, 57-58, 252 A.2d 689, 692 (1969) (Bell, C.J., dissenting).
59. Id.
60. See notes 15-16 and accompanying text supra.
[Vol. 30
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the court's decision provides little guidance to plea bargaining
participants.
The court did not identify any clear source of the right of a
defendant to enter a guilty plea free from judicial threats, or, as
the court seems to state, from any judicial participation in the
plea negotiations. The court has previously stated that if a guilty
plea is induced by promises that deprive it of the character of a
voluntary act, it must be set aside.6' Previous decisions have also
held that by pleading guilty voluntarily, a defendant waives his
right to trial and the "incidents thereof."62 In Cross, it appears
that the voluntariness requirement, and therefore the issue of
judicial participation, is closely linked with the right to a jury
trial as guaranteed by article 1, section 14 of the South Carolina
constitution and the sixth amendment to the United States Con-
stitution. These provisions are the only constitutional language
set out in the opinion.63 One might infer, therefore, that the source
of the right announced in Cross is constitutional in nature.
Although the source of the right appears to be constitutional,
the court could be adopting a "per se" approach to judicial par-
ticipation. "We find no fault" with the "per se" approach of
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(1), the court ex-
plained;64 furthermore, the language of the rule stating that the
court shall not participate in plea bargaining is emphasized in the
opinion.6" The application of Rule 11 in Werker and the "per se"
test used in Evans are also discussed by the South Carolina
court.66 This language could support the inference that the source
of the right announced is Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
In State v. Armstrong,67 the South Carolina Supreme Court
had held that a then recently decided United States Supreme
Court opinion" on acceptance of guilty pleas made Rule 11 ap-
61. Sanders v. Leeke, 254 S.C. 444, 175 S.E.2d 796 (1970); Bailey v. MacDougall, 247
S.C. 1, 145 S.E.2d 425 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 962 (1966).
62. State v. Fuller, 254 S.C. 260, 174 S.E.2d 774 (1970), vacated in part, 408 U.S. 937
(1972); accord, Rivers v. Strickland, 164 S.C. 121, 213 S.E.2d 97 (1975).
63. 270 S.C. at 48, 240 S.E.2d at 516.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 49-50, 240 S.E.2d at 517. The court does not mention the "relevant circum-
stances" approach used in Brown or the similar approach used in Brady.
67. 263 S.C. 594, 211- S.E.2d 889 (1975).
68. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). The Armstrong court held that Boykin
required the states to follow Rule 11 in accepting guilty pleas.
1979]
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plicable to the states, apparently via the fourteenth amend-
ment." In Cross, however, the court did not mention the
Armstrong holding, but stated that "[h]aving no rule of court or
prior case as precedent, we determine what is constitutionally
required as a matter of fairness."7 Referring to the extent a judge
can be involved in the bargaining process, the court uses the
words "shall not" as used in Rule 11. 7' Apparently the court does
not view revised Rule 11, at least the portion prohibiting judicial
participation in plea bargaining, as being constitutionally man-
dated. The court instead appears to view Rule 11 as a rule of
procedure rather than a constitutional requirement binding on
the states.
A recently decided case, Beaver v. State,72 contains nothing
to negate the inference that the source of the right announced in
Cross is the constitutional right to a jury trial. In Beaver, the
supreme court applied the Cross holding to a post-conviction re-
lief case.73 The court said, in dictum, that "Cross did not involve
a new constitutional rule . . . [but] simply applied the prevail-
ing constitutional 'voluntariness' standard to a given fact situa-
tion . . . . ",7 The court, therefore, has evidently not adopted the
"per se" test as embodied in Rule 11 and enunciated in the Evans
decision. This result, however, is not clear from either Cross or
Beaver. The Cross decision does ostensibly rely on the constitu-
tional guarantee of trial by jury to support its holding that judi-
cial threats, as a matter of law, violate a defendant's right to
choose voluntarily whether to plead guilty.
Cross, and now by negative inference, Beaver, imply that not
all judicial participation in plea bargaining is "per se" coercive.
Each set of facts must be independently examined to determine
if the participation denied defendant the full exercise of his con-
stitutional rights. Both in appeals, like Cross, and habeas corpus
actions, like Beaver, the finding of coercion in the form of judicial
threats entitles defendant to a vacation of the sentence and with-
drawal of his guilty plea.7 ,When another form or participation
69. Id. at 597, 211 S.E.2d at 890.
70. 270 S.C. at 48, 240 S.E.2d at 516.
71. Id. Another significant fact is that the court restricted its holding to the facts of
the particular case. Id. at 50, 240 S.E.2d at 517.
72. - S. C. -, 247 S.E.2d 448 (1978).
73. Id. at 247 S.E.2d at 449.
74. Id. at , 247 S.E.2d at 450. The court did not cite or examine any state or
federal cases that "embody" the standard but decided that "it would be inappropriate
only to apply [Cross] prospectively." Id.
75. 270 S.C. at 51, 240 S.E.2d at 518; - S.C. at _ 247 S.E.2d at 450.
[Vol. 30
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occurs, however, the court should examine all relevant circum-
stances surrounding the plea. If no inducements are found that
would deprive the plea of voluntariness, the trial court judgment
should be affirmed and no withdrawal allowed.76 The federal
courts have followed this approach in determining whether to set
aside a state plea of guilty.
77
The impact of Cross on the South Carolina judicial system
is uncertain because it leaves many questions unanswered. Does
the decision allow the judge to tell counsel what the possible
range of the sentence will be before plea submission or whether
the judge favors the bargain struck between defense counsel and
solicitor? Will the confused judge now be unwilling to proffer any
helpful, relevant information concerning disposition of the plea
until he is about to pronounce sentence in the courtroom? Are all
ex parte discussions between judge and solicitor or judge and
defense counsel concerning defendant's plea now frowned upon?
What stance will the supreme court take in less extreme cases
when the judge makes only a prediction of what will be the conse-
quences of a plea? These questions need to be answered to guide
circuit judges, solicitors, and defendants in their interractions in
plea bargaining.1
8
It has been estimated that in many courts, as much as ninety
percent of all criminal cases are terminated by guilty pleas;"
therefore, it is important that any decision that affects plea bar-
gaining be clear and precise to provide for a fair procedure, hope-
fully ending the criminal prosecution at the trial level. Cross is
neither clear nor precise. The court could have expressly prohib-
ited all judicial participation as some courts have done."0 The
court could have enumerated exceptions to the rule, if any were
contemplated,"1 or it could have created a definitive rule of proce-
dure similar to Rule 11 that would have clearly indicated the
76. See State v. Lambert, 266 S.C. 574, 225 S.E.2d 340 (1976); State v. Cantrell, 250
S.C. 376, 158 S.E.2d 189 (1967).
77. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Robinson v. Housewright, 525 F.2d 988 (7th Cir.
1975); United States ex rel. Elias v. McKendrick, 439 F.2d 771 (2d Cir. 1971).
78. See generally, Uviller, Pleading Guilty: A Critique of Four Models, 41 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 102 (1977).
79. D. NEWMAN, CONVIcrION: THtE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT
TRIAL 77 (1966); ABA STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 1.
80. See, e.g., State v. Buckalew, 561 P.2d 289 (Alaska 1977). A recent Alaska opinion
reserved for later decision the question of whether Buckalew requires the adoption of
the involuntary "per se" rule. Gordon v. State, 577 P.2d 701, 706 (Alaska 1978).
8i. See United States ex rel. Robinson v. Housewright, 525 F.2d 988, 990-91 (1975);
R. v. Turner, [1970] 2 Q.B. 321.
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parameters of judicial discretion in the matter."' Total prohibi-
tion of judicial participation could generate abuse of prosecu-
torial discretionary powers; the nolle prosequi, overcharging, plea
concessions, and manipulative docket control as prosecutorial
bargaining techniques under this system may eventually
"frustrate the interests of both parties by backing them into a
trial which they do not want and from which they cannot hope
to gain." 3 The judge eventually might abdicate his sentencing
authority to the solicitor by choosing to ratify automatically the
bargain agreed to by the prosecutor and defendant.84 These possi-
bilities suggest that a more thorough examination of the virtues
of a total prohibition is in order before a binding precedent is
established.
The Cross decision demonstrates the South Carolina Su-
preme Court's awareness that many problems are associated with
plea bargaining. The uncertainty generated by Cross, however,
should be eliminated. A detailed opinion or a court-promulgated
rule is needed to delineate the exact purpose and extent of judi-
cial participation in plea negotiations. When the court, legisla-
ture, and bar association develop definite procedures that will
make plea negotiations uniform, fair, and public, examples of
coercion and misuse such as those in Cross hopefully will not
arise.
William A. Ready, III
82. This course is still open to the supreme court through promulgation of a rule
similar to Rule 11, or to the legislature if it decides statutory guidance is needed.
83. For a detailed study of this phenomenon, see Note, Restructuring the Plea Bar-
gain, supra note 3, at 292-303.
84. Id. at 296-97.
[Vol. 30
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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE-THE
PROCEDURAL RULE-MAKING POWER OF THE SOUTH
CAROLINA SUPREME COURT
On July 13, 1978, the South Carolina General Assembly, ov-
erriding the Governor's veto,' enacted a statute2 requiring the
supreme court to submit its rules of practice and procedure to the
legislature for approval as a condition to the rules' effectiveness.
3
After preliminary activity by the court questioning the Act's con-
1. Veto Overridden, 1978 S.C. SEN. J. 2057-58; Veto Overridden, 1978 S.C. HousE J.
3223-24. #
2. No. 575, 1978 S.C. Acts 1683.
3. The Act provides in its entirety:
Section 1. There shall be established a "Court Register" which shall be
published and maintained in current status with all proposed and final form
rules promulgated by the Supreme Court. The Register shall be the responsibil-
ity of the Court Administrator. The Court Administrator shall transmit to the
Clerk of Court of each county and to the Legislative Council a copy of the Court
Register and all additions thereto when published. All rules promulgated by the
Supreme Court shall become effective in the following manner:
(a) All rules governing the administration of courts of the State shall be-
come effective upon publication of such rules in the Court Register.
(b) Rules governing the practice and procedures of all Courts of the State
shall become effective upon publication in the Court Register and approval by
the General Assembly pursuant to the provisions of Section 2 of this Act.
Section 2. All rules and amendments to rules governing practice and proce-
dures in all courts of this State promulgated by the Supreme Court and pub-
lished in the Court Register shall be submitted by the Supreme Court to the
respective Judicary Committees of each House of the General Assembly while
the General Assembly is in regular session, but not later than the first day of
February of that session, or if the General Assembly is not in session, at the
beginning of its next regular session.
Section 3. Except for rules and amendments thereto governing the practice
and procedures of all courts of the State promulgated by the Supreme Court
after April 4, 1973, all current rules promulgated by the Supreme Court prior
to the effective date of this Act shall be published in the Court Register and shall
remain in full force and effect. All rules and amendments thereto governing the
practice and procedures of all courts of this State promulgated by the Supreme
Court after April 4, 1973, shall be submitted to the respective Judiciary Com-
mittee of each House of the General Assembly no later than August 1, 1978. The
respective Judiciary Committee shall review such rules and submit any request
for changes or objections to the rules either collectively or separately to the
Supreme Court no later than December 31, 1978. If no action is taken by the
Supreme Court in response to the requests for changes or objections by the
respective Judiciary Committee by February 1, 1979, such rules shall remain
effective only if the General Assembly adopts such rules in the manner pre-
scribed in Section 2 of this Act.
Section 4. This Act shall take effect upon approval of the Governor.
Id. at 1683-84.
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stitutionality4 the General Assembly postponed the date for ini-
tial compliance with the Act to February 15, 1979.- At the outset
of the 1979 legislative session, the General Assembly repealed the
Act, substituting a similar enactment, Act No. 4 of 1979, which
affirmed the legislature's veto power over judicial rules governing
practice and procedure.'
Two potentially divergent considerations underlie this con-
troversy. First, the acknowledged tendency of judicial procedures
to affect the outcome of litigation requires some limitation on
these procedures to avoid frustrating substantive policies. Sec-
ond, our tripartite system of government and the separation of
powers doctrine necessitate a vigorous and independent judiciary.
The sensitive, intragovernmental conflict engendered by these
considerations is not susceptible to facile resolution; moreover,
the editorial response prompted by the legislation 7 demonstrates
that the precise distribution of the procedural rule-making au-
4. Chief Justice J. Woodrow Lewis offered South Carolina Attorney General Daniel
R. McLeod and State Bar President J.D. Todd, Jr. the opportunity to file briefs on the
issue of the constitutionality of the Act. Although the Chief Justice indicated that
"questions concerning the constitutionality of the act should be promptly decided," it was
unclear whether the attorney general was to institute a declaratory judgment action or
the briefs were to be merely advisory. Letters from Justice Lewis to Attorney General
McLeod and President Todd (July 14, 1978).
5. Compliance Date Postponed 1978 S.C. SEN. J. 37; Compliance Date Postponed
1978 S.C. HousE J. 3560. It is interesting to note that on the final day of the 1978 legislative
session the General Assembly utilized a concurrent resolution, S. 1150, to delay the imple-
mentation of Act 575. Since the statute had already been validly enacted by the legisla-
ture's override of the governor's veto and contained an effective date provision among its
terms, such a statutory amendment should have been accompanied by the formalities of
three legislative readings and gubernatorial approval. S.C. CONsT. art. MI, § 18; Id. art.
IV, § 21. Thus, the legislature's attempted amendment of the statute by concurrent
resolution was arguably void ab initio; the legal ramifications of the supreme court's
failure to comply with the Act under these circumstances are unclear.
6. No. 4, 1979 S.C. Acts (R1). Section 1 of this act is identical to that of the previous
act. Section 2 now provides:
All rules and amendments to rule governing practice and procedure in all courts
of this State promulgated by the Supreme Court shall be submitted by the
Surpeme Court to the Judiciary Committee of each House of the General As-
sembly during a regular session, but not later than the first day of February
during each session. Such rules or amendments shall become effective ninety
calendar days after submission unless disapprovea by concurrent resolution of
the General Assembly.
Id. The supreme court did not contest the validity of this act, and adopted a court rule
reflecting acceptance of the statute. S.C. CoDE ANN., Sup. Ct. R. 40 (order promulgated
Feb. 6, 1979).
7. Columbia Record, July 19, 1978, at 12, col. 1; The State, July 19, 1978, at 12, col.
1; Columbia Record, Aug. 1, 1978, at 16, col. 1; The Transcript, July 1978, at 1, col. 1; Id.
at 2, col. 3.
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thority between the legislative and judicial branches of govern-
ment is indeed "a matter of great popular concern."'
In assessing the constitutionality of the Act, both the su-
preme court's constitutional and inherent rule-making powers'"
must be examined, as well as the statutory rule-making power the
court has historically exercised.II The source of the court's author-
ity over practice and procedure, whether it derives from a grant
of constitutional power, a delegation of legislative power, or a
claim of inherent power, is largely determinative of the extent of
the court's authority and its relation to the concurrent authority
of the General Assembly.' 2 Furthermore, the overall rule-making
authority of the South Carolina Supreme Court comprises three
distinct powers' 3 related to the administration of courts, admis-
sion to the practice of law and attorney discipline, and practice
and procedure, each with its own peculiar analytical underpin-
nings. Although the scope of the court's power over admission to
the bar and attorney discipine is self-evident, the delineation
between administration and procedure is less clear. Roughly
speaking, the court's administrative rule-making power includes
within its ambit matters such as court facilities and employees,
brief form, assignment of judges, and contempt - the details
attendant to the business of dispensing justice" - while the
court's procedural rule-making power embraces pleading and
practice, discovery, rules of evidence, appellate review, and the
issuance of writs - the mechanics of the adjudicative process.
This distinction is of more than theoretical significance, because
article V, section 4 of the South Carolina Constitution aparently
vests absolute control over administration of the courts and ad-
mission to the practice of law in the supreme court, but the
court's grant of procedural rule-making power is "[s]ubject to
8. 1 C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 3.27 (3d ed. 1972).
9. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 4.
10. See notes 38-46 and accompanying text infra.
11. This statutory authorization remains, perhaps reduntantly, in the 1976 Code.
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 14-3-640, 15-1-170 (1976) (supreme court rules); id. § 15-1-160 (circuit
court rules); id. § 14-23-270 (probate court rules).
12. Ashman, Measuring the Judicial Rule-Making Power, 59 JuD. 215, 216-18 (1975);
Joiner & Miller, Rules of Practice and Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule-Making, 55
MICH L. REV. 623, 624-27 (1957); Pound, Procedure Under Rules of Court in New Jersey,
66 HARv. L. REV. 28, 36 (1952).
13. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 4.
14. The court's power over admission to the practice of law can be viewed as a
component of its administrative rule-making authority.
1979]
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the statutory law. .. "I An investigation of all three facets of
the supreme court's rule-making authority is beyond the scope of
this comment, which will seek to address primarily the court's
procedural rule-making power.
I. THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. Statutory Sources
The South Carolina experience with the procedural rule-
making power has, until recently, been exclusively one of legisla-
tive delegation."6 Since colonial times, 7 the General Assembly has
delegated its rule-making authority to the courts, while retaining
ultimate control. The Practice Act,'" passed in 1791, gave the
supreme court power to make rules not inconsistent with legisla-
tive enactments; with relatively minor modifications over the
years,'9 this approach has formed the core of the court's rule-
making authority. The acquiescence of the judiciary in this dele-
gation of power raises an "almost conclusive presumption that
the legislative conduct is constitutionally supported."2 Further-
more, "what the legislature has granted it may likewise take
15. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 4.
16, For an excellent discussion of the situation prior to the 1972 amendment of art.
V of the S.C. Constitution, see Note, The Judiciary and the Rule-Making Power, 23 S.C.L.
Rav. 377 (1971).
17. Act No. 980 of 1708, § II, 7 S.C. STATUTES AT LARGE 199-200 (McCord 1840). This
statute provided that the "courts shall and may, from time to time, make such just and
reasonable rules and orders, (not contrary to any thing herein contained), for the regular
and more convenient conducting and effectual dispatch of business therein, as to them
shall seem necessary and proper. . . ... Id. at 199.
18. Act No. 1491 of 1791, § IV, id. at 262. '[Ihe. . .courts may, from time to time,
make such just and reasonable rules and orders for the more regular and convenient
conducting and effectual dispatch of business therein, as to them shall seem necessary and
proper. . . ." Although the power of the court is not expressly made subject to the power
of the legislature, the requirement that rules be not inconsistent or contrary to legislative
enactments, which appears in both the preceding and subsequent statutes, is presumably
implicit in the Act. See Kaplan, The Validity of Legislative Regulation of Procedure: An
Historical Approach, 16 TMiP. L.Q. 51, 57 (1941).
19. The grant of procedural rule-making power was first codified in 1870. Act No. 300,
§§ 473-74, 1870 S.C. Acts 528. That Act provided:
The Justices of the Supreme Court and the Judges of the Circuit Courts...
shall revise the general rules of the Circuit Courts and made amendments ther-
eto, and such further rules not inconsistent with this Code, as may be necessary
to convey it fully into effect. - . .The Justices of the Supreme Court shall from
time to time make such rules for the orderly conduct of business in said Court,
as they may deem proper, not inconsistent with this Act.
Id. at 528. The act has been amended twice, Act No. 39, 1882 S.C. Acts 56; Act No. 458,
1908 S.C. Acts 1035, and is currently codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-1-160 to -170 (1976).
20. Gard, Procedure by Court Rules, 5 U. KA. L. REv. 42, 44 (1956).
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away";' the power conferred by such enabling legislation is not
permanent and may be recalled,22 or the legislature may expunge,
modify, or supersede particular court rules,n even without the
express reservation of that right.Y
B. Constitutional Sources
In 1972, the Judiciary Article of the South Carolina Constitu-
tion of 1895 was extensively revised. Article V, section 4, as
amended, established a constitutional source for the supreme
court's powers over administration, practice and procedure, and
admission to the practice of law. The provision states in pertinent
part:
The Supreme Court shall make rules governing the administra-
tion of all courts of the State. Subject to the statutory law, the
Supreme Court shall make rules governing the practice and pro-
cedure in all such courts. The Supreme Court shall have juris-
diction over the admission to the practice of law and the disci-
pline of persons admitted.?
The language of this section was drafted by "The Committee
to Make a Study of the Constitution of 1895" (West Commit-
tee).2" The Committee's version, which read "subject to the law,"
was amended, however, by the Senate to "subject to the statutory
law." In its final report, the Committee observed that "[u]nder
this section, the Supreme Court is given rule-making power to
supplement the rules enacted by the General Assembly." By
characterizing the court's power as supplemental, the Committee
indicates the relative positions of the two rule-making authori-
ties. The minutes of the West Committee's meetings also illumi-
nate the drafters' intent.
MR. ABERNATHY: Actually the question here is to take a
middle ground between what we have now, which makes it to-
tally regulated by the General Assembly, and what is proposed
21. Hall, Judicial Rule-Making is Alive but Ailing, 55 A.B.A.J. 637, 639 (1969).
22. Gard, supra note 20, at 53-55; Why Rule-Making Power is Constitutional, 12 JUD.
67, 68 (1928).
23. 12 JUD. 67, 68 (1928).
24. Harris, The Rule-Making Power, 2 F.R.D. 67, 67-68 (1941).
25. S.C. CONST. art. V, § 4.
26. The Committee was created by a concurrent resolution of the General Assembly.
§ 342, 1966 S.C. SEN. J. 1014.
27. THE COMNiTrEE TO MAKE A STUDY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 1895 [hereinafter
referred to as West Committee], FINAL REPORT 63 (1968).
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in several of the constitutions, to allow the courts to make its
[sic] own rules even including rules of ethics.
MR. STOUDEMIRE: You'll really be opening up a Pandora's
box there.
MR. ABERNATHY: Right. I wasn't about to propose that. I am
merely suggesting an intermediate position to allow the courts
to make rules in the manner provided by rules of the Supreme
Court and under such regulations as the General Assembly may,
by law, prescribe; to allow the courts to participate through the
necessary rule-making power within the authority given to it by
the legislature.
MR. STOUDEMIRE: Professor Abernathy and I agree that we
might make two sentences out of this which would be clearer
"and, subject to the law" and so on. Put a period after the
second sentence ending in "in all the courts of the State." Then
start off "subject to the law, the Supreme Court shall make"
and pick up again. I was a little bit worried about the reference
"subject to law." We can make it into two sentences.
MR. SINKLER: Well, we don't use the phrase in South Caro-
lina "subject to the law." What we're talking about there, I
assume is statute law. So you want to say "subject to such law
as the General Assembly shall enact."
MR. STOUDEMIRE: Bring in the General Assembly."
The committee's decision to divide the clauses granting the
court's administrative and procedural rule-making powers into
two separate sentences, instead of the single sentence suggested
by the preliminary draft, with the limitation "subject to the law"
preceding the constitutional grant of authority over practice and
procedure to the court, clearly indicates that the power itself
rather than merely the manner of its execution is subject to the
law.
A study compiled for the Institute of Judicial Administration
by the late James Dreher (professor of law at the University of
South Carolina) and Glenn Abernathy (professor of political sci-
ence and member of the West Committee), noted that the effect
of the phrase "subject to the law" is to "subject the power of the
Supreme Court to make rules of any type to legislative control
"29
The West Committee, with the concurrence of the Judicial Re-
form Committee, uses that qualifying phrase in connection with
28. WEsT CoMrirrEE, MINUTES 96-99 (Dec. 8, 1967).
29. Id. at 98.
[Vol. 30
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the Court's power to make rules governing "practice and proce-
dure." Even that limitation is more restrictive than that now
favored in many judicial reform movements, but it is accepted
in many jurisdictions and usually works out well in practice.,,
The interpolation of the word "statutory" in the clause by the
Senate Judiciary Committee31 further underlines the predomi-
nant position of the General Assembly.
Although the intent of the drafters is unambiguous and the
import of their language clear on its face, particularly when
viewed in the context of the history of the rule-making power in
South Carolina, the construction of the constitutional provision
is complicated by the origin of the phrase "subject to the law."
The West Committee borrowed that qualification from the con-
stitution of New Jersey,3" where it has had a tortured history. In
the widely-criticized 3  case of Winberry v. Salisbury,34 the Su-
preme Court of New Jersey construed that phrase as subjecting
the court's rule-making power only to "substantive" law, render-
ing the court's procedural rule-making power absolute. In the face
of legislation history to the contrary, the court held that
the phrase "subject to law" cannot be taken to mean subject to
legislation. . . . The only interpretation of "subject to law"
that will not defeat the objective of the people to establish an
integrated judicial system and which will at the same time give
rational significance to the phrase is to construe it as the equiva-
lent of substantive law as distinguished from pleading and prac-
tice. . . . We therefore conclude that the rule-making power of
the Supreme Court is not subject to overriding legislation, but
that it is confined to practice, procedure and administration as
such."3
The addition of "statutory" in the "subject to the law" clause,
however, precludes such an interpretation in South Carolina,36 as
30. J. DREHER & G. ABERNATHY, THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF SOUTH CAROLINA 105 (1971).
31. Report of the Senate Judiciary Committee Proposing S. 428, 1971 S.C. SEN. J.
1361. For the full text of those amendments, see 1972 S.C. SEN. J. 215.
32. N.J. CONsT. art. 6, § 2, T 3. "[Ihe Supreme Court shall make rules governing
the administration of all courts in the State and, subject to the law, the practice and
procedure in all such courts." Id. See WES COMMITTEE, WORKING PAPER No. 8, at 9 (1967).
33. Kaplan & Greene, The Legislature's Relation to Judicial Rule-Making: An Ap-
praisal of Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 HARv. L. REv. 234 (1951); 31 B.U.L. REv. 97 (1951);
36 IowA L. REv. 569 (1951); 25 N.Y.U.L. REv. 903 (1950); 27 RUT. L. REV. 345 (1974); 24
TEMP. L.Q. 477 (1951); 99 U. PA. L. REv. 418 (1950).
34. 5"N.J. 240, 74 A.2d 406 (1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950).
35. Id. at 245, 247, 255, 74 A.2d at 409, 410, 414.
36. Pound, Procedure Under Rules of Court in New Jersey, 66 HARv. L. REv. 28, 29
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statutory law necessarily includes both procedural and substan-
tive enactments. Moreover, New Jersey seems to be abandoning
this peculiar construction.37
Thus, while article V, section 4 of the South Carolina Consti-
tution empowers the supreme court to make rules governing prac-
tice and procedure, this power is clearly subordinate to the statu-
tory enactments of the legislature. The General Assembly may
regulate the use of the court's power so long as this regulation
does not withdraw or negate the power itself, or interfere with the
orderly administration of justice; any reasonable regulation of the
court's power by the General Assembly is permissible under this
constitutional provision. Although article V, section 4 established
a new source for the supreme court's rule-making authority, its
effect is merely to reaffirm the delegated nature of that authority
and the superiority of the legislature within this sphere.
C. Inherent Sources
Although the supreme court has made occasional reference
to its inherent powers, it has made no claim that such power
exists over practice and procedure. In Brown v. Piedmont Manu-
facturing Co.," the court indicated that it possessed the inherent
power to regulate the form and manner of raising exceptions, 9 but
this is more akin to an administrative power than a procedural
one." In Carolina Glass Co. v. State,4" in which a legislative con-
ferral of judicial power on a state commission was held unconsti-
tutional, the court seemed to allude to separation of powers argu-
ments to establish certain inherent powers.4 2 This approach is
inappropriate here, however, because the procedural rule-
making power is not exclusively judicial;13 this is particularly
true in light of the apparently diminished significance of the
separation of powers doctrine in South Carolina since State ex
(1952); 14 RuT. L. REv. 608, 616 (1960). See Crowe, Power of the Supreme Court to
Prescribe Rules of Practice and Procedure under the Proposed Judicial Amendment, 39
CHi. BAR REC. 295, 296 (1958).
37. Weinstein, Reform of Federal Rule-Making Procedure, 76 CoLUM. L. REv. 905, 924
(1976); 27 RuT. L. REv. 345, 353 (1974); 14 RuT. L. Rav. 608, 614 (1960). See Busik v.
Levine, 63 N.J. 351, 307 A.2d 571 (1973); State v. Mount, 30 N.J. 195, 152 A.2d 343 (1959).
38. 109 S.C. 343, 96 S.E. 138 (1918).
39. Id. at 347, 96 S.E. at 138.
40. See notes 53-59 and accompanying text infra.
41. 87 S.C. 270, 69 S.E. 391 (1910), aff'd, 240 U.S. 3055 (1916).
42. Id. at 291, 69 S.E. at 399.
43. See notes 92-94 and accompanying text infra.
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rel. McLeod v. Edwards." Moreover, the supreme court has
consistently recited statutory authorization for its rules" and
held that those rules must yield when in conflict with legislative
enactments. 6
II. THEORIES OF INHERENT POWER
A. Inherent Judicial Power
The South Carolina Supreme Court's failure to assert an
inherent procedural rule-making power does not negate the exist-
ence of this power or diminish the relevance of its theoritical
bases. The primary effect of such an inherent power in the judici-
ary is to limit the scope of the legislature's concurrent power,
acting as a check against legislative encroachment upon essential
judicial functions. Although many courts have claimed an inher-
ent power over practice and procedure, 47 the genesis and ambit
of the power are not readily apparent. As one court observed,
"[t]he inherent power of a court is an undefined quantity and
an undefinable term, and courts have indulged in more or less
loose expressions concerning it." '"8 Nevertheless, three basic theo-
ries have been advanced in support of such a power in the courts:
authority by necessity or implication, authority by historical
analogy, and authority by separation of powers.
1. Authority by Necessity. -Attendant to a constitutional
grant of jurisdiction to a court is the "inherent right to function
and function efficiently. ' 49 This right is implied as "essential to
the existence, dignity, and function of the, court as a constitu-
tional tribunal and from the very fact that it is a court . . . "
Charged with the exercise of judicial power, courts necessarily
must possess the capacity to transact expeditiously their business
in the discharge of that duty.' This rationale, however, contains
certain intrinsic limitations. As it is directed toward the power of
a particular court, it provides justification solely for the regula-
tion of that court's business and not for the regulation of lower
44. 269 S.C. 75, 236 S.E.2d 406 (1977).
45. Note, supra note 16, at 385.
46. State v. Cottingham, 224 S.C. 181, 77 S.E.2d 897 (1953).
47. See generally Annot., 158 A.L.R. 705 (1945); Annot., 110 A.L.R. 22 (1937).
48. In re Waugh, 32 Wash. 50, 51, 72 P. 710, 710 (1903).
49. People v. Brown, 238 Mich. 298, 300, 212 N.W. 968, 969 (1927).
50. Dowling, The Inherent Power of the Judiciary, 21 A.B.A.J. 635, 636 (1935).
51. Kolkman v. People, 89 Colo 8, 33, 300 P. 575, 584-85 (1931); Craft v. Common.
wealth, 343 S.W.2d 150, 151 (Ky. 1961); Busciano v. Rhodes, 385 Mich. 474, 484, 189
N.W.2d 202, 206 (1971); State v. Davis, 141 W. Va. 488, 493, 93 S.E.2d 28, 31 (1956).
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courts by a superior one.52 Moreover, the rationale can be legiti-
mately applied only within the circumscribed area of those pow-
ers essential to the existence and proper function of a court .13
Accordingly, courts have claimed an inherent power by necessity
to govern contempt, 4 physical surroundings, equipment and
employees,5" brief form, 6 and other "time, place and manner
' ' 7
aspects of their business.
Implied powers are better grounded on matters ancillary to
the administration of justice," with the distinction between broad
procedural policy and administrative detail both appropriate and
significant." The regulation of practice and procedure is not gen-
erally within the ambit of this power, except when legislatively
enacted rules impair the proper function of a court." Further-
more, reasonable legislative action removes the necessity on
which this theory is based.
2. Authority by Historical Analogy.-The second major
theory in support of an inherent judicial authority over practice
and procedure rests on historical analogy, justifying the exercise
of particular powers by a court through the historical practice of
comparable courts. In delineating the powers of the judiciary,
many courts have recognized the constructional significance of
colonial and nineteenth-century American practice, as well as the
British practice both at the time of the reception of the common
52. See Gard, supra note 20, at 44; Paul, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts,
WASH. L. REv. 223, 225-26 (1926); Note, The Court v. the Legislature: Rule-Making Power
in Indiana, 36 IND. L.J. 87, 97 (1960).
53. See Brydonjack v. State Bar Ass'n, 208 Cal. 439, 442, 281 P. 1018, 1020 (1929);
In re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 476, 172 P. 1152, 1153 (1918); Joiner & Miller, supra note 11,
629-30; Hibschman, The Power to Regulate Court Procedure, 71 U.S.L. REv. 618, 642
(1937); Note, Judicial Rule-Making: Propriety of Iowa Rule 344(f), 48 IowA L. REv. 919,
921-22 (1963); 36 MICH. L. REv. 82, 87 (1937).
54. Little v. State, 90 Ind. 338 (1883); Hale v. State, 55 Ohio St. 210, 45 N.E. 199
(1896).
55. State ex rel. Kitzmeyer v. Davis, 26 Nev. 373, 68 P. 689 (1902) (courtroom equip-
ment); Belvin v. City of Richmond, 85 Va. 574, 8 S.E. 378 (1888); In re Courtroom, 148
Wis. 109, 134 N.W. 490 (1912) (court's quarters); In re Janitor, 35 Wis. 410 (1874) (court
employees).
56. Epstein v. State, 190 Ind. 693, 128 N.E. 353 (1920); Solimeto v. State, 188 Ind.
170, 122 N.E. 578 (1919).
57. 21 GEO. L.J. 352, 352 (1933). See Washington-Southern Navigation Co. v. Balti-
more & Philadelphia Steamboat Co., 236 U.S. 629 (1924).
58. Williams, The Source of Authority for Rules of Court Affecting Procedure, 22
WASH. U.L.Q. 459, 482-85 (1937).
59. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 3 (1940); Joiner & Miller, supra note
I1, at 629-30.
60. Ex parte Harker, 49 Cal. 465, 467 (1875); 36 MICH. L. REv. 82, 87 (1937).
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law and before.' Perhaps more importantly, Dean Roscoe Pound
was a forceful proponent of this view, and his emphasis on Engish
legal history, presented in a 1906 address to the American Bar
Association" and in a number of influential articles over the suc-
ceeding decades, 3 has had a lasting impact on inherent power
theories.
Although the procedural rule-making authority can be traced
more distantly in history,"4 the English practice subsequent to the
Norman conquest is of greater significance. Tidd, commenting on
the common law of procedure in his Practice of the Court of
King's Bench, stated that
[t]he practice of the court, by which the proceedings in an
action are governed, is founded on ancient and immemorial
usage. . . . regulated from time to time by rules and orders,
acts of parliament, and judicial decisions. . . . The rules and
orders of the court are either such as are made for the regulation
of its general practice, or such as apply only to the proceedings
in a particular cause. The general rules are confined in their
operation to the court in which they are made; and for the most
part respect the mode of conducting the proceedings. Hence we
find, that acts of parliament are frequently necessary, to intro-
duce regulations extending to all courts, or creating some
change or alteration in the proceedings themselves.5
Even obscured by the "haphazard growth of six centuries,""" the
61. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108-09 (1924); Hanna v. Mitchell, 202 App. Div.
504, 196 N.Y.S. 43 (1922), affd mem. 235 N.Y. 534, 139 N.E. 724 (1923); State v. Harmon,
31 Ohio St. 250, (1877); In re Constitutionality of Statute, 204 Wis. 501, 236 N.W. 717
(1931).
62. This address has been characterized as "epoch-making." C. HAINES & C. HAINES,
PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS OF GOVERNMENT 363 (1921).
63. E.g., Pound, Procedure under Rules of Court in New Jersey, 66 HARv. L. REv. 28
(1952); Pound, Organization of Courts, 11 JuD. 69 (1927); Pound, The Rule-Making
Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A.J. 599 (1926); Pound, Regulation of Judicial Procedure by
Rules of Court, 10 ILL. L. REv. 163 (1915); Pound, Reforming Procedure by Rules of Court,
76 CENT. L.J. 211 (1913).
64. Under Roman law, the edicts of the praetor governed procedure. Cummings, A
Rounded System of Judicial Rule-Making, 24 A.B.A.J. 513, (1938); Robinson, Self-Help
or Self-Destruction? The Rule-Making Power, 9 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 122, 128 (1937). See
generally, J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (2d ed. 1938); J. MUIRHEAD,
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE PRIVATE LAW OF ROME (1916). Procedure was regulated
in Anglo-Saxon England by royal command. KAPLAN, supra note 18, at 51. See generally
F. ATrENBOROUGH, LAWS OF THE EARLIEST ENGLISH KINGS (1922). These instances indicate,
at least historically, an executive claim to the procedural rule-making authority.
65. 1 W. TIDD, THE PRACTICE OF THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH xi-xii (2d ed. 1799).
66. Hyde, From Common Law Rules to Rules of Court, 22 WASH. U.L. REV. 187, 187
(1937).
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distinction between procedural and purely administrative rules is
still apparent.
Jenks, in A Short History of English Law, 7 noted that court
rules governing practice extend "for a long period in English legal
history"6 and dates the earliest recorded Chancery orders from
1388,9 common-law rules from 1457,1o Exchequer rules from
1571,71 and King's Bench rules from 1604.2 Pound relied heavily
on these rules, particularly the rules of the King's Bench, to es-
tablish an historical basis for characterizing the procedural rule-
making authority as inherent in the judiciary.73 The theory, how-
ever, requires several major qualifications. First, many older rules
of court were derived from decisions in particular cases, an origin
distinguishable from promulgation.74 Other rules were merely
declarative of custom," or even restatements of statutes.7" Sec-
ond, the history of legislative rule-making authority is equally
well established, dating at least from the Statute of Westminister
II in 1285.11 Indeed, it is surprising "how much of common law
procedure was statutory and how early Parliament ...
enter[ed] the field."7 Third, "[ilt was soon established that no
rule or custom or procedure could prevail against a specific Act
of Parliament."79 Last, what rule-making power the early English
67. E. JENKS, A SHORT HISTORY Op ENGLISH LAW (1st ed. 1913).
68. Id. at 188.
69. Id. at 189.
70. Id. The earliest known common-law rule is 35 Trinity (Henry VI), but that "refers
clearly to still older Rules, which seem to have disappeared." Id.
71. Id. Tidd dates Exchequer rules from 1592. W. TMD, THE PRACTICE OF THE COURT
OF KING'S BENCH 128 (9th ed. 1828).
72. E. JENKS, supra note 67, at 189. The oldest rule is 2 Trinity (James I), but again,
"it is more than probable that these are not in fact the first made." Id.
73. E.g., Pound, The Rule-Making Power of the Courts, 12 A.B.A.J. 599 (1926);
Pound, Regulation of Judicial Procedure by Rules of Court, 10 ILL. L. REv. 163 (1915).
74. Morgan, Judicial Regulation of Court Procedure, 2 MINN. L. REv. 81, 81-83 (1917).
75. M. BIGELOW, HISTORY OF PROCEDURE IN ENGLAND 77, 191 (1880); Hyde, supra note
66, at 188; Kaplan, supra note 18, at 52.
76. Kaplan, supra note 18, at 54.
77. 13 Edw. I (1285); 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 134
(2d ed. 1898). See generally Kaplan, supra note 18; W. TIDD, supra note 71 at 128-29;
Tyler, The Origin of the Rule-Making Power and its Exercise by Legislatures, 22 A.B.A.J.
772 (1936).
78. Hyde, supra note 66, at 190.
79. Id. It is generally acknowledged that Parliament had attained clear superiority
to the judiciary concerning the regulation of procedure by the Revolution of 1688, although
this superiority was not consistently exercised until passage of the Civil Procedure Act of
1833, 3 & 4 Will. IV, c. 42, § 3. Kaplan, supra note 18, at 51-53; Pound, 12 A.B.A.J. 599,
599 (1926); Shapiro, Judicial Independence: The English Experience, 55 N.C.L. REv. 577,
621 (1977); Note, supra note 53, at 919. Since the enactment of the Supreme Court of
Judicature Act of 1873, 36 & 37 Vict., c. 66, the procedural rule-making power in England
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courts did possess might be more properly ascribed to their pecu-
liar position as administrative arms of the King,80 rather than to
the inherently judicial nature of the procedural rule-making
power. From this perspective, the procedural rules of the early
courts might be viewed as merely "emanations of the royal pre-
rogative." ' 8' This fusion of governmental entities renders the Bri-
tish experience of slight relevance to American tribunals, which
derive their authority from constitutional grants.
8 2
Colonial and nineteenth-century American history does not
provide any additional support for an inherent procedural rule-
making power in the judiciary. Quite the contrary, the regulation
of practice and procedure in the United States has consisted
largely of "the persistent use of legislation .... ."I "Uniformly
throughout the colonies the Legislatures retained the ultimate
control over procedure; and such powers as the colonial courts
exercised in making rules was. . . under express Legislative dele-
gation. 8 14 The earliest state cases continued to recognize this leg-
islative superiority, 5 and while delegation of the rule-making au-
thority also continued to some extent, no state court claimed
such authority without statutory or constitutional jurisfication.' 7
Legislative activity in the procedural field during the latter half
of the nineteenth century was extensive.8
The history on the federal level is similar. Although an early
order of the Supreme Court indicated that the practice of the
King's Bench would be followed and altered from time to time,'"
has been executed by a Judicial Council, but ultimate control remains in Parliament as
the source of the Council's delegated authority. E. JENKS, supra note 67, at 190.
80. Hyde, supra note 66, at 188; Robinson, supra note 64, at 124-25; supra note 79,
at 608 Kaplan, supra note 18, at 51. See R. POUND, FOREWARD TO A PAGEANT; ROBINSON,
JUSTICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 15 (1928).
81. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 21-22 (2d Am. ed. 1827).
82. People v. Callopy, 358 Ill. 11, 192 N.E. 634 (1934). 29 ILL. L. REV. 911, 914-15
(1935); 21 GEO. L.J. 352, 352 (1933).
83. Sunderland, The Exercise of the Rule-Making Power, 12 A.B.A.J. 548, 550 (1926).
84. Kaplan, supra note 18, at 55; Williams, supra note 58, at 491-92.
85. Thompson v. Hatch, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 512 (1826); Risher v. Thomas, 2 Mo. 98
(1828); Synder v. Bauchman, 8 Serg. & Rawl. 336 (Pa. 1822); Vanatta v. Anderson, 3 Binn.
417 (Pa. 1811); Dobosq v. Guardians of the Poor, 1 Binn. 415 (Pa. 1808); Kaplan, supra
note 18, at 58-59.
86. Robinson, supra note 64, at 131.
87. Williams, supra note 58, at 486.
88. W. HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING 87 (1897); Robin-
son, supra note 64, at 132-33.
89. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 411 (1792).
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the Court has also acknowledged congressional superiority", and
awaited legislative authorization before promulgating rules of
procedure.'
3. Authority by Separation of Powers.-The final theory in
support of an inherent judicial rule-making authority is based on
the doctrine of separation of powers, which would preclude the
legislative exercise of a power that was exclusively judicial in
character. Historically, this rationale is anomalous because rule-
making originally was considered a legislative prerogative; in-
deed, separation of powers arguments were raised as constitu-
tional objections to the delegation of the rule-making power from
the legislatures to the early state courts. 2 From a theoretical
viewpoint, rule-making does appear more analagous to a legisla-
tive function than a judicial one, resembling law-making more
than adjudication;93 the adversarial relationship, case or contro-
versy requirement, and deliberative approach - hallmarks of the
adjudicative process - are notably absent. The judicial promul-
gation of a rule is comparable to the legislative enactment of a
statute. In addressing these objections, most courts have held the
power to be neither exclusively legislative nor judicial, but rather
concurrent, and separation of powers arguments are therefore
inapposite ."
The specious view that procedural rule-making power is ex-
clusively judicial can be traced to a i928 "editorial" 5 by Dean
Wigmore, founded on "logic and policy" as opposed to historical
or judicial precedents. Although this article has been character-
ized as almost "dogmatic"96 and "impish," 7 "better taken as the
jeu d'esprit of a master than as a serious constitutional analy-
90. Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 245 (1819).
91. 46 Miss. L.J. 849, 857-58 (1975).
92. Marvel, The Rule Making Power of the Courts, 9 B.U.L. REV. 91, 93 (1929);
Editorial, Why Rule-Making Power is Constitutional, 12 JUD. 67, 69 (1928).
93. Weinstein, Reform of Federal Rule-Making Procedure 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3
(1976); see Walsh, Rule-Making Power on the Law Side of Federal Practice, 6 ORE. L. REV.
1, 13 (1926).
94. E.g., Beers v. Haughton, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 51 (1825); Wayman v. Southard,
23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825); Ernst v. Lamb, 73 Colo. 132, 213 P. 994 (1923); State v.
Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 646 (1936); State ex rel. Foster-Wyman Lumber Co. v. Superior
Court, 148 Wash. 1, 267 P. 770 (1928); In re Constitutionality of Statute, 204 Wis. 501,
236 N.W. 717 (1931). 43 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 776, 786 (1968). The rule-making authority is
perhaps most properly viewed as comprising legislative, judicial, and executive elements.
S. ROSENBAUM, THE RULE-MAKING AUTHORITY OF THE ENGLISH SUPREME COURT (1917).
95. Wigmore, All Legislative Rules for Judicial Procedure are Void Constitutionally,
23 ILL. L. REV. 276 (1928).
96. Hibschman, supra note 53, at 619.
97. Williams, supra note 58, at 504.
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sis, ' " it nonetheless has had a significant effect. The continued,
though unwarranted, vitality of this curious proposition is dem-
onstrated by Governor Edward's sole reliance on it to support his
veto of Act No. 575.11 But, while "[t]ight division of governmen-
tal powers into three 'departments' may afford logical symmetry
in court opinions; it does not always lend itself to practical solu-
tion of governmental problems."'' 0
B. Inherent Legislative Power
The legislative branch can also claim an inherent power to
promulgate rules governing practice and procedure. "Incidental
to the determining of policies and expressing them in legislative
acts is the choice of ways and means for making policies effec-
tive;"'0 ' the plenary power to legislate conferred on a legislature
constitutionally includes the power to prescribe procedural rules
for state courts.' 2 A procedural rule-making power in the legisla-
ture is also supported historically. ,"' Moreover, the authority may
draw its sustenance from the police powers of the legislature,"',
or from any other policy legitimately within its domain."'5
Senator Thomas Walsh'"' was a persistent advocate of legisla-
tive authority based on separation of powers arguments,"'" al-
though such arguments are no more appropriate to the legisla-
tive branch than to the judiciary. "[I]n the main, except within
narrow limits, the legislatures may constitutionally either regu-
late practice and procedure, entirely or in part, or confer upon,
or concede to, the courts the power so to do."' '5
98. Kaplan & Greene, The Legislature's Relation to Judicial Rule-Making: An Ap-
praisal of Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 HARv. L. REV. 234, 251 (1951).
99. 1978 S.C. SEN. J. 3; 1978 S.C. HOUSE J. 3222.
100. 36 IND. L.J. 87, 98 (1900).
101. 12 JUD. 67, 67 (1928).
102. Ex parte Foshee, 246 Ala. 604, 606, 21 So. 2d 827, 829 (1945) (citing Porter v.
State, 234 Ala. 11, 174 So. 311 (1937)); see Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941);
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825).
103. Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control over Judicial Rule-Making, A Problem
in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 3 (1958); Walsh, supra note 93, at 13.
104. C. SANDS, supra note 7, at § 3.27. Dowling, supra note 50, at 641; 36 MICH. L.
REV. 82, 87 (1937).
105. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 3 (1941); Joiner & Miller, supra note 11,
at 629-30; 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 776, 786 (1968) (footnote omitted).
106. As chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Sen. Walsh consistently
blocked attempts to delegate rule-making power to the U.S. Supreme Court, and federal
enabling legislation was not passed until after his death in 1933. Robinson, supra note 64,
at 133.
107. See Walsh, supra 93.
108. Hibschman, supra note 53, at 644. See 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Laiw § 128a
(1956); 21 C.J.S. Courts § 170 (1956). 36 MICH. L. REv. 82, 87 (1937).
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C. Relationship of Judicial and Legislative Powers
"[Tihe power to regulate procedure resides exclusively nei-
ther in the legislatures nor in the courts,"' ' and while "the power
to make its own rules for the conduct of its business is inherent
in the court[s] . . . [i]t is not absolute but subject to limita-
tions statutory provisions of general law.""10
When the legislature enters the rule-making field the courts will
bow to its judgment so long as these rules accord with the proper
administration of justice. When, however, it appears that the
legislative rule unduly hampers the court in the performance of
the duties imposed upon it by the Constitution, the rule adopted
by the court will prevail."'
The vast preponderance of cases in this country adopt this posi-
tion, recognizing legislative hegemony in the absence of a consti-
tutional or statutory grant of superior rule-making power to the
judiciary." 2 No American jurisdiction recognizes an inherent rule-
making power over procedure that is "super-statutory.
" 
3
The primary function of the inherent rule-making power of
the courts is as a check against legislative encroachment upon the
courts' constitutional powers and jurisdiction, a "reserve of...
power.""' "It must necessarily be that the court has inherent
power to preserve its existence and to fully protect itself in the
orderly administration of its business." s Hence, a court cannot
utilize its inherent rule-making power to promulgate a procedural
rule in derogation of a legislative enactment unless the court's'
function is significantly impaired or its existence is actually
threatenedy by the legislature's action. Even Dean Pound was
forced to admit that
[t]he most we can be sure of is that the power exists in the
absence of legislation, that it may be assigned as a whole to the
109. Hibschman, supra note 53, at 644.
110. Bryan v. State, 94 Fla. 909, 910, 114 So. 773, 774 (1927).
111. State ex rel. Conway v. Superior Court, 60 Ariz. 69, 81, 131 P.2d 983, 988 (1942).
112. E.g., Annot., 158 A.L.R. 705 (1945); Annot., 110 A.L.R. 22 (1937); see Kaplan,
supra note 18, at 58-59; Williams, supra note 58, at 494-95; 27 RUT. L. REv. 345, 346 (1974).
113. Williams, supra note 58, at 500-06.
114. Burton v. Mayer, 274 Ky. 263, 267, 118 S.W.2d 547, 549 (1938). E.g., State ex
rel. Conway v. Superior Court, 60 Ariz. 69, 131 P.2d 983 (1942); Agron v. Checker Taxi
Co., 412 111. 145, 105 N.E.2d 713 (1952); Craft v. Commonwealth, 343 S.W.2d 150, 151-52
(Ky. 1961); Riglander v. Star Co., 98 App. Div. 101, 90 N.Y.S. 772 (1904), aff'd, 181 N.Y.
531, 73 N.E. 1131 (1905).
115. In re Waugh, 32 Wash. 50, 51, 72 P. 710 (1903).
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courts by legislation, and that there is ground to hope that legis-
latures having assigned it to the courts will come to keep their
hands off."6
Not only are inherent power arguments inconclusive, they are
also of limited significance in most American jurisdictions, where
the sovereign power of the state is distributed by constitutional
provisions to the various branches of government."
7
III. CONCLUSION
The constitutionality of Act No. 4 of 1979 as it relates to rules
of practice and procedure is unassailable."8 Section 2 of that Act
merely seeks to regulate the supreme court's use of its procedural
rule-making power by requiring the submission of all rules. This
statutory recognition of the General Assembly's right to modify,
abrogate, or supersede any rule of court goes no further than the
power the legislature would implicitly reserve in the statute's
absence. Although the provision analogous to the federal model, I'"
allowing the judicial promulgation of rules subject to a legislative
veto, is perhaps less cumbersome and more acceptable to the
supreme court, the original requirement of affirmative approval
of the court's rules contained in Act No. 575 of 1978 certainly
would not create any constitutional infirmity. " If, however, the
Act is applied in an arbitrary or capricious manner so that the
orderly transaction of the court's business is impaired, the court's
reserve of inherent power could be utilized as a counterbalancing
force. Act No. 4 of 1979 does not impermissibly diminish or en-
croach upon the supreme court's rule-making authority over
practice and procedure as granted by article V, section 4 of the
South Carolina Constitution, but merely seeks to regulate the use
of that authority by the court in a manner consistent with the
relationship intended by the drafters of the constitutional provi-
116. 3 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 642 (1959).
117. In re Cannon, 206 Wis. 374, 240 N.W. 441 (1932); see 21 C.J.S. Courts § 120
(1956).
118. This conclusion applies only to the act as it relates to the procedural rule-making
power of the court, and not to its administrative rule-making power. Since art. V, § 4 of
the South Carolina Constitution ostensibly vests absolute administrative rule-making
power in the court, the General Assembly may have no authority to require the publication
of a court register; however, the legislature's police power arguably entitles them to require
this publication for purposes of centralization and notice.
119. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).
120. Other states have required such affirmative approval of procedural rules of
courts. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 81-1501 to -1503 (1956).
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sion and the one extant in the majority of American jurisdic-
tions. "'
Thomas DeWitt Rogers, III
121. The General Assembly was quick to exercise its statutorily confirmed veto power
over procedural rules. On April 18, 1979 the South Carolina House of Representatives
rejected the supreme court's proposed rules governing the conduct of magistrates in civil
matters. Rules Rejected 1979 S.C. HousE J. 1489. The Senate concurred with this resolu-
tion on April 24, 1979. Rules Rejected 1979 S.C. SEN. J. 15-16.
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